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         A b s t r a c t    
In this paper we compare sources of economic growth in Japan and the United States from 
1973 through 2000, focusing on the role of information technology (IT). We have adjusted 
Japanese data to conform to U.S. definitions in order to provide a rigorous comparison 
between the two economies. The contribution of information technology to economic growth 
was strikingly similar in Japan and the United States in the last half of the 1990’s. The 
growth rate of the Japanese economy declined drastically in the early 1990’s, but revived 
modestly during the last half of the decade. In this period the share of the Japanese gross 
domestic product devoted to investment in computers, telecommunications equipment, and 
software rose sharply and the rate of total factor productivity growth increased. However, the 
contributions of labor input and other sources of growth in Japan lagged far behind those in 
the United States.   
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1. Introduction 
Jorgenson (2002b) has shown that a substantial portion of the growth resurgence of the U.S. 
economy after 1995 can be attributed to advances in information technology (IT). The rapid 
growth in U.S. labor productivity during the economic slowdown that began in 2001 suggests 
that prospects for potential growth of the U.S. economy have been considerably enhanced.3  
By contrast, the Japanese economy of the 1990’s appeared to be mired in a slump that 
followed the collapse of the “bubble economy” of the 1980’s. This leads to the question, has 
the Japanese economy failed to benefit from advances in information technology? 
There are many examples of cutting-edge businesses in the U.S., such as Dell and Wal-Mart, 
that produce and use information technology effectively.    While it is often argued that major 
Japanese businesses do not fully utilize information systems, research conducted in Japan 
shows that the burgeoning levels of IT investment by businesses during the last half of the 
1990’s did contribute substantially to increased labor productivity growth.4  It is clear that 
the impact of investment in IT on both the Japanese and U.S. economies has been very 
substantial. But how and to what degree do the effects of this investment differ between the 
two countries?   
In order to compare the relationships between investment in information technology 
equipment and software and productivity growth in Japan and the United States, it is 
essential to eliminate the differences in treatment of IT in the official statistics. Under the 
United Nations System of National Accounts of 1993 (SNA93)5  Software is recognized as an 
investment in both countries, but the definitions are different. Second, prices of equipment 
and software must be measured in a consistent way, reflecting the advances in information 
                                                  
3  Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002b) have analyzed the potential growth of the U.S. economy.   
4  See Economic Research Institute, Economic Planning Agency (2000). 
5  See United Nations (1993).    3 
technology that are taking place.   
We have adopted the framework of Jorgenson (2002a) for analyzing the relationship between 
investment in information technology and economic growth, incorporating the effects of IT 
investment by the household and government sectors as well as the business sector. An 
important objective of this paper is to develop data for Japan that are comparable to those of 
the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). We have constructed new data on 
software investment for Japan and “internationally harmonized” IT prices in order to 
generate comparable data on IT investments for Japan and the U.S. Finally, we have 
compared the results with the official Japanese statistics.     
In the following section we present an analytical framework based on the production 
possibility frontier introduced by Jorgenson (1995c).6  In Section 3 we describe the data on 
investment in information technology equipment and software for Japan and the U.S. and 
address the issues that must be resolved in order to harmonize the data for the two countries. 
In Section 4 we present the results of our analysis of the role of information technology in the 
growth of the Japanese and U.S. economies. Finally, we summarize our conclusions and 
outline the agenda for future research.   
2. Theoretical framework 
(1) Role of Information Technology in Economic Growth 
Moore’s Law states that the density of semiconductor chips doubles in every 18-24 months 
and this pace of technological progress has continued for more than three decades. Doubling 
every 18 months is equivalent to increasing the density of chips by 100 times every 10 years. 
The staggering rate of technical progress in the IT-producing industries -- semiconductors, 
computers, software, and telecommunications equipment – has led to a very rapid decline in 
IT prices. This price decline has continually stimulated the deployment of IT equipment and 
                                                  
6  This framework is used by Jorgenson and Stiroh (2002), Jorgenson (2002), and Jorgenson, 
Ho, and Stiroh (2002a).    4 
software by the IT-using industries in Japan and the United States.   
For example, in 1990 a typical personal computer (PC) used Intel’s 386 microprocessor with a 
clock speed of 20 megahertz (MHz) for the central processing unit. Intel’s Pentium 4 
processor, used in today’s PCs, has a clock speed of 2.8 gigahertz (GHz) -- 140 times as fast. 
However, the price of a personal computer in Japan has changed very little, varying within a 
range of 200,000-500,000 yen. The technological progress in PC’s can be observed in the rapid 
improvements in performance, rather than the decline in the price of a typical machine. 
The key to capturing the rapid development of information technology is the construction of a 
constant-quality price index for IT equipment and software that holds performance constant. 
Economic statisticians in Japan and the United States have used prices for matched models 
of IT products in overlapping time periods, as well as hedonic models of IT prices, to 
construct constant-quality price indexes. However, the methodology for price statistics differs 
between the two countries, making international comparisons difficult. We will return to this 
issue in the section on price data for Japan and the United States. 
(2) Production Possibility Frontier Approach 
In order to capture the rapid pace of decline of IT prices, we employ the production possibility 
frontier introduced by Jorgenson (1995c). 
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Aggregate output Y consists of non-IT investment goods n I , computer investment c I , software 
investment s I , investment in communications equipment t I , consumption of non-IT goods 
and services n C , and consumption of IT capital services by governments and households c C . 
Aggregate input X consists of non-IT capital services n K , computer services c K , software 
services s K , communications equipment services t K , and labor services L. Total factor 
productivity (TFP) is denoted A.  5 
The major advantage of this approach is the explicit role it provides for modeling the impacts 
of relative price changes between IT and non-IT outputs and inputs. For example, a 
constant-quality price index for computers is used in constructing computer investment data 
on the output side. In addition, the computer price index is included in the rental price of 
computer capital services on the input side and computer investment is incorporated into the 
estimate of the stock of computers used in production. These data are used on modeling the 
substitution between computers and other outputs, as well as the substitution between the 
services of computers and other productive inputs.   
Since the production possibility frontier describes the efficient combinations of outputs and 
inputs for the economy as a whole, the external costs of adjustment in levels of output or 
input are fully reflected in the prices of these components. For this reason the production 
possibility frontier is preferable to the principal competing methodology, based on the 
aggregate production function. The aggregate production function approach fails to treat 
relative price differences in output components explicitly and does not incorporate costs of 
adjustments in output or input components.7  
Under the assumption that product and factor markets are competitive, producer 
equilibrium implies that the sum of share weighted growth of outputs is the sum of 
share-weighted growth of inputs and growth in total factor productivity:   
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where  w and  v denote average value shares of outputs and inputs, respectively, in adjacent 
time periods.   
The shares of outputs and inputs add to one under the assumption of constant returns: 
1 . . . . , , , , , , = + + + + = + + + + + L t K s K c K n K c C n C t I s I c I n I v v v v v w w w w w w          ( 3 )  
                                                  
7  See Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002a) for more detail on this point.    6 
In equation (2), the growth rate of outputs is a weighted average of growth rate of 
investments and consumption goods outputs. Similarly, the growth rate of inputs is a 
weighted average of growth rates of capital and labor services inputs. The contribution of 
TFP is derived as the difference between growth rates of output and input.   
(2) Theory of Capital Service Inputs 
Data on output and labor input can be collected directly from transactions in product and 
labor markets. By contrast data for capital stock and capital service prices must be imputed 
from market transactions in investment goods. We next review the measurement of capital 
stock and capital service prices.8  Since capital stock in the current time period t K , is 
comprised of capital goods acquired in previous time periods τ − t A   and the efficiency of capital 
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If we define the mortality rate  τ m as the rate of decline in efficiency  τ d for each vintage, the 
difference in capital stock between two adjacent periods is: 
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where  t R represents the replacement requirement or the decrease in capital stock due to 
morality. If, in addition, efficiency declines at a constant rate δ, capital stock takes the form: 
1 1 ) 1 ( − − − + = − + = t t t t t t K A R K A K δ      （6） 
Similarly, the price of capital services or the rental price of using a unit of capital stock for 
one time period is derived from the following capital-market non-arbitrage condition: the 
price of capital goods is the sum of future capital rentals. The price of capital goods can be 
                                                  
8  Description of this section is based on the duality between investment and capital service 
prices developed by Jorgenson (1996b).    7 
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where  t A q , and  1 , + +τ t K q are discounted prices for capital goods and capital services, 
respectively. Evaluating this expression at the current prices for capital goods and capital 
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We can use formula (7) to express the differences in acquisition prices for capital goods over 
time: 
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where  t D q , represents the discounted price of depreciation of capital goods. If we express 
depreciation in terms of current prices, we obtain the following: 
) ( 1 , , , 1 , , − − − − + = t A t A t D t A t t K p p p p r p      （10） 
The capital rental price  t K p ,   is the sum of the cost of capital  1 , − t A t p r  and  depreciation  t D p , , 
less capital gains on the capital good  1 , , − − t A t A p p . This is the non-arbitrage condition for the 
value of investment in capital goods and the rental value of capital services.   
When the rate of depreciation on capital is constant ( ) / 1 , , δ = − t A t D p p ), the rental price 
reduces to:   
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9  We first present the benchmark case with no taxation. The empirical estimates are based 
on a model that also takes into account the effects of taxation on capital income.  8 
A higher rate of depreciation requires the recovery of investment over a shorter period of 
time and the capital rental cost increases. Similarly, if the price of a capital good is 
decreasing more rapidly, a greater future capital loss must be anticipated and the capital 
rental cost increases.   
Even if the prices of two capital goods are the same, the rates of depreciation and rates of 
change in the prices of capital goods may differ, leading to different capital rental costs. 
Equation (11) is the formula we use for imputing the rental prices of capital services from the 
prices of investment goods. However, this formula ignores the effects of taxation of capital 
income. The formula must be modified possibility to incorporate taxes, as shown by 
Jorgenson and Yun (2001). The actual formulas used in this study will be described in a later 
section.  
3. Data 
(1) Output data 
The data for Japan used in our analysis are comparable to the U.S. data presented in (2002b). 
We distinguish three sectors of the Japanese economy – businesses, governments, and 
households. The structure of the data is presented in Table 1.   
(Table 1) 
Output data are based on official estimates of gross domestic product (GDP) published by the 
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) in the Cabinet of Office of the Japanese 
Government.  
In 2000 the Japanese System of National Accounts was revised to comply with United 
Nations (1993) System of National Accounts (SNA93). The major points of revision of the 
nominal value of GDP were (1) adding custom-made software to private and public 
investments and (2) adding depreciation of public infrastructure to government consumption.  9 
ESRI estimated that the impact of these accounting changes led to a 2.0% upward shift in 
the level of GDP in 1995 and an upward shift of 0.2% in the annual growth rate GDP in 
constant prices in 1998 and 1999. 
Our study uses the SNA93 current price GDP for Japan as a starting point10. We adjust these 
data in order to achieve comparability with U.S. data, based on the U.S. National Income 
and Product Accounts (NIPA). One major difference between the Japanese SNA93 and NIPA 
is in the treatment of software. The Japanese SNA93 treats custom software as an 
investment, while the U.S. NIPA also includes prepackaged and own-account software in 
investment. Therefore, we have estimated investment in prepackaged and own-account 
software in Japan and added this to the official Japanese GDP. 
Since the household sector is included in the production sector, the capital service flow from 
consumer durables must be treated as both an output and input of households. In the 
Japanese SNA and the U.S. NIPA only capital services from owner-occupied housing is 
imputed and included in the GDP. We have treated other types of consumer durables, 
including information technology equipment and software, in the same way as housing. We 
have imputed the value of capital services for households and governments and added this to 
GDP for Japan and the U.S., following Jorgenson (2002b). 
The government sector is also included in the production sector, so that the capital services 
from government capital must be treated as an output and input of governments. In the 
Japanese SNA and the U.S. NIPA only depreciation from government capital is imputed and 
included in the GDP. However, depreciation is only one component of the price of capital 
services (11), so that we add the cost of capital and capital losses due to declines in asset 
prices to the value of government capital services. This makes the treatment of government 
capital symmetrical to business and household capital.   
Table 2 compares output data for Japan in current prices of 2000 used in this study with the 
                                                  
10  ESRI published historical SNA93 data back to 1980. Prior to 1980 only SNA68 data are 
available. Therefore, we extend SNA93 data backward by using growth rates of SNA68 data.  10 
official Japanese GDP. The value of GDP in this study in 2000 is about 533 trillion yen, 
which is about 20 trillion yen greater than the official GDP based on SNA93. About four 
trillion yen comes from adding prepackaged and own-account software investment in 
business, government, and household sectors and about 15 trillion yen comes from the 
capital service flow from consumer durables.   
(Table 2) 
We also note the difference between methods for deflating the current value of GDP to obtain 
GDP in constant prices in the Japanese SNA and the U.S. NIPA. In Japan a fixed-weight 
system of price deflators, based on weights of 1995, is used; the base year is revised every 
five years. By contrast the U.S. NIPA applies a chain-weighted price index as a deflator. 
Since the share of information technology equipment and software in GDP is increasing, the 
role of IT in the Japanese economy will be under-estimated relative to the U.S. In order to 
achieve greater comparability with U.S. data, we estimate IT and non-IT components 
separately for Japan and apply a flexible weighting scheme to estimate the rate of growth of 
output. 
  (2) Input data 
(a) investment in information technology equipment and software 
In order to make comparisons of the impact of investment in information technology 
equipment and software between countries, it is important to use a common definition of IT. 
The U.S. NIPA publishes both nominal and real values of investment by category of capital 
goods. Jorgenson (2002b) used the following categories of IT-related investment: computers 
and equipment, software, and communication equipment. In this study, we have defined 
IT-related investment for Japan in the same way11.  
                                                  
11  Specifically, the categories for computers (1995 IO category: 3311011) and computer 
peripherals (3311021) correspond to "computers and equipment," and television and radio 
(3211021), video (3211031), cable communications devices (3321011), and wireless 
communications devices (3321021) correspond to “communications equipment.”  11 
We have generated investment in IT equipment for Japan that is comparable to the U.S. 
NIPA by using the existing Japanese input-output tables. However, as discussed in the 
previous section, the definition of software in the Japanese SNA is different from the 
definition in the U.S. NIPA. Japanese GDP data, based on SNA93, include only custom-made 
software; prepackaged and own-account software are excluded. Therefore, we have estimated 
the software investments in these categories in order to match the U.S. definition. 
Since investment in prepackaged software is treated as an intermediate input in the 
Japanese input-output tables, it is straightforward to calculate public-sector and 
private-sector capital formation. In addition, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry’s 
(METI) Survey on Selected Service Industries provides data on investment in prepackaged 
and custom-made software. Therefore, we estimate investment in both prepackaged software 
and custom-made software from this survey, as well as benchmark input-output tables for 
every five years.   
Neither Japan’s input-output tables nor METI’s Survey of Selected Service Industries 
includes investment in own-account software. For this reason, we have estimated investment 
using methods similar to those used for the U.S. NIPA, described in Parker and Grimm 
(2000). Specifically, we have estimated labor expenses for software development by 
employees in industries other than the information technology sector, which produces 
custom-made and prepackaged software.   
Finally, Jorgenson (2002b) used expenditures on computers and software from Private 
Consumption Expenditure (PCE) in NIPA to estimate investment in IT equipment and 
software in the household sector
12. Similarly, government expenditures on IT equipment and 
software were taken from NIPA. We have employed data from the Survey of Selected Service 
Industries as well as household and government consumption of software in the Japanese 
benchmark input-output tables to estimate investment in IT equipment and software in the 
                                                  
12  The corresponding sectors of the Japanese input-output tables are those for computers 
(1995 IO category: 3311011), computer peripherals (3311021), cable communications devices 
(3321011), wireless communications devices (3321021), and software (8512011).  12 
household and government sectors.   
(b) Capital services   
In order to estimate capital services as precisely as possible, we have estimated capital stock 
and capital service prices by detailed category of investment goods. This enables us to take 
into account changes in the composition of capital stock. We have captured the process of 
improvement in the quality of capital associated with the substitution of investment goods 
with high marginal products, such as information technology equipment and software, for 
goods with lower marginal products, such as non-IT investment goods.     
Based on Japan’s benchmark input-output tables every five years, as well as METI’s annual 
extension tables with more than 500 commodity categories, we have estimated investment by 
62 commodity groups for business and government sectors and 20 commodity groups for the 
household sector from 1970 to 1990. We have deflated this current price investment by the 
Wholesale Price Index constructed by the Bank of Japan for business and government 
investment and by the Consumer Price Index constructed by Japanese Statistical Bureau for 
household durables. 13  
As described in a later section, we have found significant discrepancies between the pace of 
price declines for IT products in Japan and the United States. We have substituted 
“internationally harmonized prices” for these products, based on U.S. price deflators, for the 
official price deflators in Japan. We have compared the resulting estimates of investment in 
real terms with those from the Japanese official statistics.   
We have estimated capital stocks by the perpetual inventory method. Initial values of 
capital stock for 1973 are estimated by assuming that the real investment for each type 
of capital goods increased continuously in the past by the same growth rate as that for 
                                                  
13  The Japanese WPI and CPI are Laspeyres price indexes, with new benchmarks every five 
years. We constructed similar deflators for the period of our analysis. After the 2000 
benchmark the WPI will be re-named as the CGPI (Corporate Goods Price Index).    13 
the period 1970-1973.14  We have used U.S. NIPA depreciation rates for each type of 
capital goods presented by Fraumeni (1997).   
In imputing capital service prices, Equation (11) has to be modified to incorporate the 
taxation of capital income for each type of investment good in each sector. For example, 
there is a special acquisition tax for automobiles and there is no corporate tax in 
government and household sectors. Nomura (1998) took into consideration these effects 
of the Japanese tax system and many others. In this paper, we have applied the formulas 
for capital service prices used by Nomura (1998) for business, government and household 
sectors, separately.15 
(c) Labor input 
Labor input data are derived from KEIO database. This database includes the number of 
persons engaged, the number of hours worked, and average compensation per hour, 
cross-classified by age, sex, education, and the type of employee16. As in the case of data for 
capital services, the change in the quality of labor input associated with upgrading of the 
labor force can be captured by comparing the growth of hours worked with the growth of the 
labor input index. The KEIO index of labor input is based on hours worked for detailed 
categories of labor input, weighted by labor compensation per hour for each category.   
(3) Prices for investment in IT equipment and software 
We employ the production possibility frontier approach, explicitly measuring both outputs 
and inputs, so that prices of IT equipment and software affect both sides of our growth 
accounts.  
                                                  
14  In Japan, large-scale National Wealth Surveys were conducted several times prior to 1970. 
Although the results of these surveys are valuable for some purposes, for example, 
estimating war-time damages, they do not include detailed stock data on each type of 
investment good. For this reason, we have used the method described in the text to estimate 
initial values. 
15  Detailed formulas can be found in Appendix 3 of Motohashi (2002). 
16 KEO  (1996).  14 
Since technological advances are so rapid and quality changes are so dramatic, it is difficult 
to obtain satisfactory price indexes for IT products based on matched models. For this reason 
the hedonic method for constructing IT price indexes is used in both Japan and the U.S. 
  Jorgenson and Stiroh (2002) have pointed out that the price indexes used in the U.S. NIPA 
for communications equipment and software are biased upward. Only the price index for 
prepackaged software is calculated using the hedonic method, while the price for 
custom-made software is estimated from wages of programmers, assuming that labor 
productivity remains unchanged. Jorgenson and Stiroh (2002) applied prices calculated by 
the hedonic method for communications equipment and software and obtained substantial 
increases in the impact of IT investment on labor productivity growth.   
In Table 3, we compare prices from the U.S. NIPA and two hedonic price indexes used in 
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2002) with those provided by Bank of Japan for IT products in Japan.   
(Table 3) 
Although price indexes for computers in both countries are based on the hedonic method, the 
pace of price decline is much lower in Japan. The Japanese price index for computers is a 
composite index for personal computers, large-scale computers, and various kinds of 
computer peripherals.   
Differences in rates of price decline for computers between Japan and the U.S. could be due 
to differences in composition of computer investment. For example, if the share of personal 
computers (PC’s) in total computer investment were higher in the United States, the 
composite price would drop more rapidly in the U.S., since prices for PC ‘s fall faster than 
composite price index for computers. Alternatively, changes in computer prices could be 
different between the two countries. However, these explanations are not totally convincing 
because it is implausible to suppose that Japanese firms and U.S. firms are using 
substantially different computing systems. The differences in price indexes can be fully 
explained only by differences in methodology.    15 
For communications equipment the rate of price decline is slightly higher in the Bank of 
Japan’s WPI price index than in the U.S. NIPA index. Although both indexes use matched 
models, Japan’s WPI is based on a more detailed list of items and may be more accurate. 
Finally, the Bank of Japan’s price index for custom-made software uses an estimate of costs 
that assumes no increases in labor productivity. The U.S. NIPA data uses a weighted average 
of costs for custom software and a hedonic price index for packaged software, leading to a 
more rapid decline in prices. 
If differences in the behavior of prices are due to differences in methodology between the two 
countries, we have to choose one set of prices for comparative analysis. We have estimated an 
“internationally harmonized” set of prices based on U.S. price indexes this study. The basic 
idea of the harmonized price index is to use U.S. prices of IT products relative to non-IT 
products to estimate prices of IT products relative to non-IT products in Japan. This 
approach was introduced in a series of OECD studies, for example, Colecchia and Schreyer 
(2002), and has been used in international comparative studies by van Ark et. al. (2002).   
In this study, relative prices of IT to non-IT products in the U.S. are applied to prices of 
non-IT products for Japan to obtain “internationally harmonized” prices of IT products in 
Japan. This removes the impact of inflation in prices of non-IT products from our estimates 
of prices of IT products. However, it incorporates the rapid price decline of IT prices in the 
U.S. after the impact of inflation is taken into account. We have applied this approach 
separately for business, government and household sectors in Japan.   
4. Results 
(1)Information technology and economic growth in Japan and the United States 
Table 4 shows our estimates of the contribution of information technology to output and 
input of the Japanese economy, together with the corresponding results for the U.S., based on 
an update of Jorgenson (2002b). The contribution of information technology to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) includes investments in computers, software and communication  16 
equipment by business, government, and household sectors. It also includes capital service 
flows from IT equipment and software in government and household sectors, labeled 
“Information Technology Services”.   
The growth rate of GDP in Japan in the 1990’s dropped to around 2% from more than 4% in 
the 1980’s. The contribution of information technology to output growth in Japan after 1995 
was close to 1%, nearly the same as in the U.S. Slightly more than half of Japanese output 
growth in the last half of the 1990’s can be attributed to information technology. The last half 
of the 1990’s was the era of growth resurgence in the U.S. economy. While information 
technology played a significant role in this resurgence, almost three-quarters of output 
growth can be explained by the contributions of non-IT goods and services.   
(Table 4) 
Table 4 presents the sources of growth in the two countries. The growth rate of gross 
domestic income can be decomposed among the contributions of IT capital services, non-IT 
capital services, and labor services. Differences in growth rate between GDI and GDP is 
equal to the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP). Our most striking finding on the 
sources of Japanese economic growth is the surge in the contribution of capital services from 
IT equipment and software during the last half of the 1990’s, reflecting the sharp rise of IT 
investment.  
The contribution of IT capital services in the U.S. rose steadily throughout the period 
1973-2000, but fell short of the Japanese contribution before 1990. The contribution of IT 
capital in Japan declined during the first half of the 1990’s, but rebounded strongly after 
1995. The contribution of IT capital in Japan during this period was 0.90 percent per year, 
while the corresponding figure for the U.S. was 0.99 percent. The increase in the contribution 
of IT investment in Japan during the last half of the 1990’s actually outstripped the 
substantial rise in the U.S.   
Our second finding is that the TFP growth rate in Japan rose during the last half of the  17 
1990’s during a period of relatively slow growth in the Japanese GDP. This rise in TFP 
growth in Japan was only slightly less than that in the U.S. It is important to note that the 
growth rate of TFP in Japan substantially exceeded that of the U.S. throughout the period 
1973-2000. The contribution of IT capital services exceeded that of TFP growth in the U.S., 
while TFP growth was more important than the contribution of IT capital services in Japan.   
An important part of the slowdown in economic growth in Japan during the 1990’s is 
attributable to the drastic decline in the contribution of labor input analyzed by Hayashi and 
Prescott (2002). The labor input contribution dropped from 1.35 percent per year before 1990 
to negative rate of -0.16 percent before 1995 and -0.20 percent after 1995. However, the 
contribution of non-IT capital services also declined during the first half of the 1990’s and 
continued to sink during the last half of the 1990’s. By contrast the contribution of labor 
input in the U.S. fell off only modestly during the first half of the 1990’s and rose 
considerably after 1995.   
The Japanese economy grew at annual rates in the 3-5% range throughout the late 1970’s 
and 1980’s. In the 1990’s growth rates dropped to the 1% range. Although more than 10 years 
have elapsed since the burst of the “bubble economy”, there is no sign of revival in the official 
statistics. By contrast our estimates show that the surge of investment in information 
technology and software led to a modest revival of Japanese economic growth after 1995. 
This was much less dramatic that the resurgence of the U.S. economy, due the shrinking 
contributions of non-IT capital services and labor inputs in Japan. 
(2) TFP decomposition between IT and non-IT 
Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987) provide a model for tracing aggregate productivity 
growth to its sources at the level of individual industries. Productivity growth for each 
industry is weighted by the ratio of the gross output of the industry to GDP to obtain the 
industry’s contribution to aggregate TFP growth. The price or “dual approach” to productivity 
measurement employed by Jorgenson (2002b) identifies productivity growth in different 
sectors from differences between output and input price changes.    18 
Since the price of output falls rapidly in the IT-producing industries, the change in IT prices 
relative to the aggregate price index can be used as a proxy for the TFP growth rate.17 While 
an important part of the decline in IT prices can be attributed to the rapid decline of 
constant-quality prices for semiconductors, most semiconductors are used in the production 
of information technology equipment and other products. Accordingly, semiconductors appear 
as both an input and an output at the industry level and productivity growth in 
semiconductor production cancels out.   
Table 5 shows the contribution of TFP in IT-production to aggregate TFP growth in Japan 
using the dual method, compared to the contribution for the U.S. The nominal share of 
information technology in GDP in the late 1990’s was nearly the same for the two countries, 
a little more than 4%, and its contribution to the aggregate TFP growth rate was also very 
similar. The share of computers was higher in Japan than in the U.S. The relative price of 
computers fell faster than the prices of software or communication equipment, pushing up 
the contribution of IT to aggregate TFP in Japan. 
(Table  5)   
A major difference between Japan and the United States can be found in the contribution of 
TFP growth outside the IT-producing industries to economic growth. We have already seen in 
Table 4 that TFP growth in Japan exceeded that in the U.S. throughout the period 1973-2000. 
Almost all of this difference is attributable to the contribution of TFP growth outside the 
IT-producing industries. A possible interpretation of this finding is that both Japan and the 
U.S. are close to the technology frontier of information technology, while the level of 
Japanese technology continues to lag outside the IT-producing sectors. Investment in 
information technology equipment and software has resulted in convergence toward U.S. 
levels. 18  
                                                  
17  In an industry with rapid productivity growth, output price falls rapidly relative to the 
input price. TFP growth can be measured from relative change of the input price to the 
output price.   
18  This is consistent with the findings of the studies in Jorgenson (1995b), including the 
study of Jorgenson and Kuroda (1995).    19 
(3) Discussion 
(a) Sensitivity of the results to the IT price data 
In order to make a rigorous comparison between the role of information technology in 
economic growth in Japan and the U.S., we have introduced an “internationally harmonized” 
deflator for investment in information technology equipment and software in Japan, based 
on IT prices from the U.S. NIPA. The harmonized deflator drops much faster than the prices 
in the Japanese official statistics, provided by the Bank of Japan and the National Statistical 
Bureau. In this section, we investigate how this affects our estimates. 
Table 6 presents the same data as in Table 4 (Sources of Gross Domestic Product), using the 
official statistics for Japan. The price changes have significant impacts on both output and 
input data. This discrepancy becomes wider in recent periods, due to the growing importance 
of IT in Japanese economy. The annual growth rate of output in the late 1990’s falls by 0.67%, 
of which 0.40% is attributable to the slower price decline for computer investment. The 
nominal share of the computer industry in Japanese GDP is relatively large and the price 
discrepancy is much larger than for other categories of IT output.   
(Table 6) 
Slower growth of input results from a lower pace of price decline, since the growth rate of 
capital stock decreases. In addition, since the capital service price falls with a lower rate of 
price decline in equation (11), the share of IT capital services also decreases. There effects 
are revealed in the fall of the contribution of IT capital services in Table 6.   
Slower growth in both outputs and inputs leaves the TFP growth rate in Japan almost 
unaffected. The TFP growth rate in the late 1990’s falls by only 0.13%, from 1.13% to 1.00%. 
We note that the rebound of the TFP growth rate observed in our estimates can be seen in 
estimates using official price statistics as well. Since the magnitude of effects of IT prices 
increases substantially after 1995, the GDP growth rate in the late 1990’s is now lower than  20 
that in the first half of 1990’s.   
(b) Comparison with official GDP data 
It is useful to compare our estimate on aggregate output with the official GDP data. As 
described in section 3 (1), we have made some adjustments with official Japanese GDP data 
to make them more closely comparable with U.S. data. Table 7 shows the impact of each of 
the adjustments we have made on the growth rate of output. 
(Table 7) 
First, adding prepackaged and own-account software, excluded from the Japanese SNA93 
concept of GDP, does not have a big impact. Taking account of the capital service flow from 
consumer durables contributes to 0.1% - 0.2 % growth rate increase to output. The largest 
part of the difference between the official Japanese GDP and the output data used in this 
study is due to differences in IT prices. Introduction of the internationally harmonized 
deflators adds more than a half percent to the annual growth rate of the Japanese economy 
in the late 1990’s. In a period of slow growth in Japan, this is a very significant number. 
Hence, the choice of an appropriate price deflator for IT products is a very important issue in 
estimating the growth rate of the Japanese GDP. 
(c) Other issues in TFP estimation 
Our TFP growth rate in 1990’s is very high by comparison with the Economic and Social 
Research Institute (2003) and Hayashi and Prescott (2002). Since these studies are based on 
the official price statistics, it is not surprising that the TFP growth rate is different. In 
addition, we include land as a capital input, while only services from depreciable assets are 
counted as capital inputs in the other studies. The stock of land was assumed to be constant 
in our study and this stock constitutes 20-30 percent of the nominal share of overall capital 
stock. Including land reduces the shares of depreciable assets and the contributions of 
service flows from these assets. Since we have a positive growth contribution from capital  21 
services, slower growth of capital input pushes up the TFP growth rate.   
In addition, variations in the share of land in the value of capital services have a 
considerable impact on our TFP estimates. In the 1990’s land prices declined sharply after 
the burst of “bubble economy” and the nominal share of land surged due to the higher capital 
service prices. In order to determine the specific influence of land, we have recalculated TFP, 
excluding all land-related data, on the assumption that capital stock consists only of 
depreciation assets and inventories. Excluding land from capital input reduces the TFP 
growth rate to 0.29% from 1.01% in 1975-90, 0.14% from 0.74% in 1990-95, and 0.65% from 
1.13% in 1995-2000. Although the TFP growth rate goes down over all periods, the 
productivity rebound in the late 90’s survives. 
A second potential issue is that TFP is derived as a residual between the growth of output 
and the growth of input. Basu (1996) observes that TFP moves in the same direction as 
output and is pro-cyclical in the U.S.. He attributes this to the effects of market distortions. 
Since the Japanese economy experienced an economic surge in the late 1980’s and a sharp 
decline in the beginning of 1990’s, some caution is needed in interpreting the TFP growth 
rate in these periods. However, our finding of a revival of TFP growth during slow GDP 
growth in the late 1990’s is unaffected by this argument. 
5. Conclusions 
We have analyzed aggregate economic data for Japan and the U.S. to determine whether the 
increase in the rate of economic growth from surging IT investment in the U.S. in the late 
1990’s can also be observed in Japan. We have adjusted estimates of IT investments in Japan 
to achieve comparability with the U.S. estimates by Jorgenson (2002b). In order to make a 
rigorous comparison, we have applied an internationally harmonized deflator for IT 
investment in Japan. We have also used Japanese official statistics to test the robustness of 
our results. 
We have shown that the expansion of investment in IT equipment and software in the U.S.  22 
in the last half of the 1990’s, accompanied by rising growth rates of total factor productivity, 
has a precise parallel in Japan. While this phenomenon contributed to a sharp rise in the 
rate of economic growth in the U.S., it took place in a depressed economic environment in 
Japan. Growth rates of labor input plummeted in Japan during the 1990’s, dragging down 
the rate of economic growth. However, the revival of Japanese economic growth after 1995 
suggests that long-term prospects for the Japanese economy are less dismal than suggested 
by the official statistics.   
The top priority for future research is to analyze relative levels of productivity in Japan and 
the U.S., following Jorgenson and Kuroda (1995) and Jorgenson and Nishimizu (1995). Our 
conjecture is that level comparisons will show that the IT-producing industries in Japan and 
the United States are closely comparable. We anticipate that the IT-using industries in 
Japan lag behind their U.S. counterparts in the use of IT equipment and software, but will 
converge to U.S. levels. However, substantial parts of the Japanese economy are impervious 
to changes resulting from the adoption of information technology and will continue to 
languish.  
For economic policy it is very important whether TFP growth is concentrated in the 
IT-producing industries, as our results for the United States suggest. We have decomposed 
TFP growth in Japan between IT and non-IT sectors, using the decline in IT prices as a 
proxy for TFP growth in the IT-producing sectors. The growth of TFP in IT-using industries 
has been relatively strong throughout the period 1973-2000, which is consistent with 
persistence of opportunities to “catch up” to U.S. levels of technology in these industries.   
In the analysis of individual industries, the effects of statistical issues arising from 
productivity measurements will be greater. For example, although productivity growth in 
service industries has been considered to be lower than that in manufacturing industries, 
this may be related to deficiencies in price deflators for service industry outputs. For example, 
the financial services industry shows particularly higher rates of investment in IT-related  23 
equipment and software,19  but the output of this industry is difficult to measure.   
To avoid some of the statistical issues associated with the analysis of individual industries, 
analysis can also be conducted at a firm level. This would permit comparisons of the 
relationships of IT and productivity among businesses in the same industry. Brynjolfsson and 
Hitt (1995) conducted one of the first studies of the relationship between IT and productivity 
on a company level. More recently, the effects of IT investment on business organization have 
been explored by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000).   
Finally, IT investment covers a wide range of different situations -- from applications of 
CAD/CAM technology in manufacturing to applications of ERP in business services. 
Motohashi (2001) has shown that the effects on productivity vary by application. As 
illustrated by these examples, economic analysis of investment in IT has made important 
progress in many areas. However, the rapid pace of technological advance is constantly 
generating new questions. It is vital that microeconomic analysis on a company level and 
macroeconomic analysis for the economy as a whole be coordinated in order to clarify the 
mechanisms that underlie the structural changes resulting from the IT investments. 
                                                  
19  Griliches (1994) discusses statistical issues in the measurement of service sector output as 
a source of under-estimation of the impact of IT investment.    24 
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Table 1: Variables used in growth factor analysis 
  Business sector  Public sector  Household sector 
Output 93SNA  Official 
GDP + software 
adjustments 
93SNA Official 
GDP + software 
adjustmsnts 
93SNA Official GDP + 
capital service from 
household 
Capital Input  (Depreciable Assets) 
-  Based on investment series by 62 
types of asset (5 types of IT), capital 
stock and capital service are 
estimated. 
(Land) 
-  The stock of land is assumed to be 
constant at macro level. Capital 
service price is estimated from land 
price 
(Inventory) 
-  Use SNA base aggregated inventory 
stock and price to estimate capital 
service  
Based on investment 
series by 20 types of 
asset (3 types of IT), 
capital stock and 
capital service are 
estimated. 
 
Labor  KEO data for labor inputs by type of 
labpr 
－ 
(Note) Refer to Motohashi (2002) for details in depreciable asset data 
Table 2: Comparing current price output in 2000 
(in billion yen)
Official GDP 93SNA 513,377
+Software Adjustment 4,154
+Consumer Durables Adjustment 15,338
Adjusted Output data 532,868
Reference: Official GDP 68SNA base 490,518  
Table 3: Comparison of IT prices between Japan and the United States 
          Japan 　 US
　　   (WPI, BOJ） (BEA) (case1) (case2)
  1980-90 1990-00 1990-98 1990-98 1990-98
Computer -7.0% -7.2% -19.5% -19.5% -19.5%
Comm. Equip. -2.8% -3.1% -2.0% -10.7% -17.9%
Software 4.1% 1.1% -1.7% -10.1% -16.0%   28 
Table 4: Sources of Gross Domestic Products 
(JAPAN) 
　 1975-90 1990-95 1995-00
Gross Domestic Product - 4.70 1.89 2.15
Contribution of Information Technology - 0.61 0.40 1.08
Computers - 0.40 0.27 0.58
Software - 0.07 0.05 0.18
Communications Equipment - 0.13 0.04 0.17
Information Technology Services - 0.01 0.03 0.14
Contribution of Non-Information Technology - 4.09 1.49 1.07
Gross Domestic Income - 3.69 1.15 1.02
Contribution of Information Technology Capital Services - 0.42 0.31 0.90
Computers - 0.28 0.21 0.61
Software - 0.10 0.07 0.17
Communications Equipment - 0.04 0.04 0.12
Contribution of Non-Information Technology Capital Ser - 1.93 1.00 0.33
Contribution of Labor Services - 1.34 -0.16 -0.20
Total Factor Productivity - 1.01 0.74 1.13
Notes:  Average annual percentage rates of growth. The contribution of an output or input is the rate of growth,  
 
(US) 
1948-73 1973-90 1990-95 1995-00
Gross Domestic Product 3.99 2.87 2.43 4.12
Contribution of Information Technology 0.20 0.45 0.57 1.11
Computers 0.04 0.16 0.18 0.35
Software 0.02 0.09 0.15 0.31
Communications Equipment 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.20
Information Technology Services 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.25
Contribution of Non-Information Technology 3.79 2.42 1.86 3.01
Gross Domestic Income 2.98 2.63 2.19 3.44
Contribution of Information Technology Capital Services 0.16 0.40 0.48 0.99
Computers 0.04 0.20 0.22 0.54
Software 0.02 0.08 0.16 0.28
Communications Equipment 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.17
Contribution of Non-Information Technology Capital Ser 1.78 1.08 0.64 1.10
Contribution of Labor Services 1.04 1.15 1.06 1.35
Total Factor Productivity 1.01 0.25 0.24 0.68
Notes:  Average annual percentage rates of growth. The contribution of an output or input is the rate of growth,  
  29 
Table 5: Decomposition of TFP growth 
JAPAN 1975-90 1990-95 1995-00
Total Factor Productivity Growth 1.01 0.74 1.13
Contributions to TFP Growth:
Information Technology 0.24 0.32 0.47
Computers 0.20 0.26 0.40
Software 0.02 0.04 0.03
Communications Equipment 0.02 0.02 0.04
Non-Information Technology 0.77 0.42 0.66
Relative Price Changes:
Information Technology -17.1 -10.4 -7.7
Computers -19.7 -15.7 -24.4
Software -3.5 -3.1 -1.8
Communications Equipment -2.5 -2.9 -4.2
Non-Information Technology 7.6 1.6 -0.5
Average Nominal Shares:
Information Technology 2.22 3.63 4.19
Computers 1.03 1.65 1.65
Software 0.59 1.21 1.58
Communications Equipment 0.60 0.77 0.96
Non-Information Technology 95.36 93.85 92.99
US 1973-90 1990-95 1995-00
Total Factor Productivity Growth 0.25 0.24 0.68
Contributions to TFP Growth:
Information Technology 0.19 0.26 0.45
Computers 0.12 0.15 0.29
Software 0.02 0.05 0.07
Communications Equipment 0.06 0.06 0.09
Non-Information Technology 0.06 -0.02 0.23
Relative Price Changes:
Information Technology -7.4 -7.3 -10.3
Computers -21.1 -18.1 -30.9
Software -3.2 -4.0 -3.6
Communications Equipment -4.2 -4.1 -5.8
Non-Information Technology 0.0 0.1 0.0
Average Nominal Shares:
Information Technology 2.60 3.46 4.36
Computers 0.61 0.81 0.94
Software 0.60 1.30 1.90
Communications Equipment 1.39 1.34 1.51
Non-Information Technology 96.56 95.35 94.22   30 
Table 6 Sources of GDP by using Official Price Data in Japan 
1975-90 1990-95 1995-00
Gross Domestic Product - 4.54 1.67 1.58
Contribution of Information Technology - 0.45 0.18 0.51
Computers - 0.26 0.11 0.16
Software - 0.03 0.02 0.12
Communications Equipment - 0.15 0.04 0.17
Information Technology Services - 0.01 0.02 0.06
Contribution of Non-Information Technology - 4.09 1.49 1.07
Gross Domestic Income - 3.57 1.00 0.57
Contribution of Information Technology Capital Services - 0.29 0.16 0.44
Computers - 0.17 0.10 0.21
Software - 0.07 0.02 0.11
Communications Equipment - 0.05 0.04 0.12
Contribution of Non-Information Technology Capital Ser - 1.93 1.00 0.33
Contribution of Labor Services - 1.34 -0.16 -0.20
Total Factor Productivity - 0.98 0.67 1.00
Notes:  Average annual percentage rates of growth. The contribution of an output or input is the rate of growth,  
 
Table 7: Comparison of output with official GDP in Japan 
 
 1975-90 1990-95 1995-00
Official Statistics (93SNA) 4.19 1.49 1.39
     (68SNA GDP series) (4.13) (1.44) (1.02)
   +Software Adjustment 0.11 -0.01 0.02
   +IT consumer durables 0.01 0.02 0.06
   +Non-IT consumer durables 0.24 0.17 0.10
Adjusted by national statistics 4.54 1.67 1.58
   +price adjustment (Computer) 0.14 0.16 0.42
   +price adjustment (Software) 0.04 0.04 0.06
   +price adjustment (Comm. Equip) -0.02 0.00 0.01
   +price adjustment (IT services) 0.00 0.02 0.09
Adjusted by harmonized price 4.70 1.89 2.15  